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Article 5

RETREAT FROM "FAULT"?: AN ENGLISH
LAWYER'S VIEWS
J. Neville Turner*

r.

INTRODUCTION

It was with some hesitation that I agreed to contribute to a
dialogue in an American law journal on an issue so contentious as
this; particularly as the journal is that of a university at which I
spent a delightful year. For, if the literature is representative, my
thinking does not commend itself to most American scholars.! It
would be understandable, therefore, if readers dismissed this paper, written by an Englishman residing in Australia, as irrelevant
to an essentially American inquiry.
European scholars have in the past tended to look askance at
the more permissive American divorce laws; 2 but of late influential voices have been heard advocating a change in the basis of
*

LL.B. (Hons.) Manchester (England); Lecturer-in-Law, University of

Adelaide; Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Judicature (England).
See, e.g., Rutman, Departure From Fault, 1 J. FAMILY L. 181 (1961);
Bradway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law of Divorce, 47
CORNELL L.Q. 374 (1962); Symposium-Divorce: A Re-examination of
Basic Concepts, 18 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1953); Pound, Foreword
to a Symposium on Divorce, 28 IowA L. REV. 179 (1942) SELEcTED
EssAys ON FAMIy LAW 872 (1950); Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault
Without Perjury,52 VA. L. REV. 32 (1966); Foster, Spadework for a Model Divorce Code, 1 J. FAMILY L. 11 (1961); Bradway, Myth of the
Innocent Spouse, 11 TUL. L. REV. 377 (1937); Gradwohl, Janice L., The
Doctrine of Recrimination in Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. REv. 409 (1958);
Morrow, Divorce Reform in Texas-the Path of Reason, 18 Sw. L.J. 86
(1964); Comment, Terminating a Marriage in Nebraska, 43 NEB. L. REv.
156 (1963).
2 English courts have persistently refused to recognize American divorce
decrees to which sister American states would accord full faith and
credit. Cf. Gatty v. Attorney-General [1951] P. 444, Mountbatten v.
Mountbatten [1959] P. 43. But recently the President of the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the English High Court appears to
have approved Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1947), and Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Lepre v. Lepre [1965] P. 52, 62,
63. Consensual divorce has until very recently been considered anathema. Cf. McCardie J. in Laidler v. Laidler (1920) 36 Times L.R. 510:
"The matrimonial relationship is the basis of national life. A rigorous
law attends the formalities of that relationship. A strict and rigorous
code safeguards the circumstances of its dissolution. Divorce by mutual consent is remote from the contemplation of English law." (Emphasis added.)
[This dictum may, however, be ironical.] Cf. Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Report, CMD. No. 9678,
69 (1956).
'
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divorce law.3 Some English commentators have, probably rightly,
already perceived radical judicial departures from traditional attitudes. 4 The present climate of opinion 5 suggests that there is a real
possibility of a "non-fault" statute being seriously canvassed in the
United Kingdom Parliament in the immediate future, although an
attempt to introduce non-culpable separation for seven years as a
ground of divorce failed as recently as 1963.6 Recent articles sug'7
gest that English jurists too favour "departure from fault.
The subject of this dialogue is thus a very live issue in England, as well as in some states of the United States8 and some
provinces of Canada; 9 limited "breakthroughs" have already been
8 E.g., Scarman J., Family and Law Reform-a Public Lecture delivered

at the University of Bristol, March 18, 1966; Hon. Sir. Jocelyn Simon,

President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division-Report of
a Speech, 115 L. J. 363 (1965); Simon, Seven Pillars of Divorce Reform,
62 L. Soc'y Gazette 344 (1965).
4 Brown, Cruelty without Culpability or Divorce Without Fault, 26
MODERN L. REv. 625 (1963); Webb, Breakdown versus Fault-Recent
Changes in United Kingdom and New Zealand Divorce Law, 14 INT'L
& COmP. L.Q. 794 (1965); Eekelaar, Crisis in Divorce Law: England
and France, 15 INT'L & Coiv. L.Q. 875 (1966). The observations of
these commentators are based to a large extent on two House of Lords
cases, decided on the same day-Gollins v. Gollins [1964] A.C. 644;
Williams v. Williams [1964] A.C. 698; see Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
606 (1964).
A permanent Law Reform Commission, established by Lord Gardiner,
the Lord Chancellor, has just published a report on family law,
favouring the introduction of voluntary separation as an additional
ground of divorce: Law Commission, Report, Cm. No. 3123 (1966).
A few months previously, a report of the Anglican Church suggested
that matrimonial offences should be "abolished," and a "breakdown"
test substituted. "Putting Asunder (sic)--a Divorce Law for Contemporary Society"-Report to the Archbishop of Canterbury of a group
under the chairmanship of the Bishop of Exeter (1966).
Such is the zeal for reform at present that no part of the common
law is sacred. Amid the general approbation is felt occasional disquiet
-Cf.

KEETON, THE NoIuAN CONQUEST AND THE Coi'_.voN LAw

(1966).

6 See Stone, The Matrimonial Causes and Reconciliation Bill, 1963, 3 J.
FAaVLy L. 87 (1963); Stone, The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963, 4 J.
FAmviLY L. 49 (1964).
7 Kahn-Freund, Divorce Law Reform? 19 MODERN L. REV. 573 (1956);
Mostyn, New Thinking on Divorce, 116 NEw L. J. 49 (1965); Oerton,
Marriage Breakdown, 60 L. Soc'y GAZETTE 655 (1963); Stone, supra
note 6; Brown, supra note 4.
8 The present "non-fault" provisions of states are well set out in Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L. REV. 32
(1966).
9 In two provinces (Quebec and Ontario), divorce is granted only by
Parliament; in the remaining eight provinces, adultery is the only
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achieved in New Zealand 0 and Australia;" and, among non-com12
mon law jurisdictions, peoples so diverse as Eastern Europeans,
18
14
15
Scandanavians, Germans and Frenchmen have shown a tendground for divorce. For a criticism of the existing laws, see Fitch, As
Grounds for Divorce, Let's Abolish Matrimonial Offenses, 9 CAN.B. REv.
78 (1966). See also Skelly, A Comparative Survey of the Development
of Matrimonial Relief, 2 MAN.L.J. 29 (1966).

10 Matrimonial Proceedings Act, Act of 1963 (N.Z.).

New Zealand, char-

acteristically, was the first Commonwealth country to introduce nonculpable separation as a ground for divorce: Divorce and Matrimonial

Causes Amendment Act, Act of 1920, § 4 (N.Z.).

See Inglis, Divorce

Reform in New Zealand, 43 CAN. B. REV. 519 (1965) for a guarded
criticism of the liberal law and procedures. See also Inglis, New Zealand Experiment in Divorce and Nullity Legislation, 14 INT'L & COIP.
L.Q. 654 (1964); Webb, supra note 4.
11 Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 28(m) (Aust.). Accounts of
the Australian law include: Nygh, Family Law in Australia, 4 J.
FAMILY L. 185 (1964); Selby, The Development of Divorce Law in
Australia,29 MODERN L. REV. 473 (1966); Morris, The Australian Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 641 (1962).
12 Many Eastern European countries have adopted most permissive family
laws since the Second World War. E.g., the Family Codes of Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Eastern Germany. Ease of divorce is, of course, an
essential doctrine of communism. For Soviet Russia, see infra note 17.
18 In Sweden, a divorce is available either (1) where both spouses, be-

cause of a profound and lasting disruption consider their cohabitation

irreparable and have applied for a decree of separation, a decree of
divorce is automatically available after one year, or (2) where one
spouse alone applies, the other opposing-the applicant has an apparently not heavy burden of proving that profound and lasting disruption has been caused by disparity of temperament and outlook. CODE
OF MARRIAGE, chap. 11, § 1 (Sweden 1915).
Other Scandinavian countries have similar rules. See Schmidt, The "Leniency" of the Scandinavian Divorce Laws [ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS STUDIA
JURIDICA STOCKHOLMIENSIA 18]

1963.

See B.G.B., Ehe. G. 48, which provides for divorce in the case of a three
years' separation. This ground, however, appears to be far less utilized
than the other grounds, particularly that contained in paragraph 43,
based on fault: see WOLF, LuKE & HAx, SCEMaDUNG UND SCEMIDUNGSRECHT
471 (1949).
16 Cf. Freed, Grounds for Divorce in French and American Law, 1 J. FAmLy L. 241 (1961).
Strangely, "la doctrine" seems to be more cautious than "la Jurisprudence." Cf. II DAVID, LE DROir FRANcAiS, 34 (1960):-'ans les
principles, notre droite est attache a la notion du divorce-sanction
et les seules causes de divorce qu'il admet constituent des violations
des devoirs et obligations du mariage." And Cf. VOMnN, MANUEL DE
DROIT CmvL 83 (13th ed. 1963): "Le divorce est-il necessaire? ....
Quand iln'existe pas, les 6poux font 1'effort n~cessaire pour se supporter l'un l'autre, effort qu'ils ne fond plus lorsqu'ils savent pouvoir
s'evader du mariage par le divorce. Surtout, le divorce est pernicieux
pour les enfants qui en sont les principales victimes."
14
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ency to relax their divorce laws.
As Professor Rheinstein has pointed out,' 6 the "liberals" have
not had it all their own way, and in some jurisdictions there has
been a decided retraction from previously permissive laws.1 7 But,
on the whole, it cannot be denied that there is a cosmopolitan dissatisfaction with what one might call the "traditional" basis of
granting or refusing relief.
The reasons for this dissatisfaction are not hard to find: the
decline in power and authority of the Christian religions, the prevalence of "utilitarianism" as a social philosophy, the constant emphasis of the behavioural sciences on the artificiality of marital
guilt, the more elastic morality of the age; there is much discontent
too with traditional divorce machinery, and particularly with the
doctrine of recrimination, which appears to epitomize the absurdity
of divorce by "fault."'
The present article will seek to defend the matrimonial offense as the basis of divorce law, though admitting that some
modification is necessary to eliminate undoubted anomalies and
make the process more viable. Naturally, I shall present a view
drawn substantially on experience in England and particularly in
Australia, a country with ideals and values similar to those of the
United States; but I hope, in all humility, that the argument will
not be thought entirely irrelevant to the debate in Nebraska.

Ir.

RECRIMINATION-IS IT NECESSARY TO "FAULT"?

Of the critics of traditional divorce law, the majority in the
United States single out recrimination as its principal iniquity.
The doctrine of recrimination has been vigorously disapproved by
scholars,' 9 many of whom assume that it is a necessary element of
a divorce law based on commission of-a matrimonial offense.
Is this, however, so? Apart from a closely circumscribed ex16 Rheinstein, Trends in Marriageand Divorce Law of Western Countries,
3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1953).
17 Soviet Russia is the most notorious example.

E.g., Wolff, Aspects of
Marriage and Divorce Laws in Soviet Russia, 12 MODERN L. REv. 190
(1949); O'Connell, Recent Developments in Soviet Domestic Relations
Laws, 5 CATHOLIc LAw. 271 (1959).
18 See infra note 19.
19 E.g., Raskin and Katz, The Dying Doctrine of Recrimination in the
United States of America, '35 CANR. B. REV. 1047 (1957); Gradwohl,

Janice L., Doctrine of Recrimination in Nebraska, 37 NEB. L. REv. 409

(1958); Beamer, The Doctrine of Recriminationin Divorce Proceedings,
10 U. KAN. Cry L. REv. 213 (1942).

68

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 1 (1967)

ception, incurable insanity, 20 England, like most American jurisdictions, adopted and has retained specified grounds for divorce
which all
import some wrongdoing on the part of the respondent
1
spouse.

2

As in every state of the United States, the canon law applied
by the ecclesiastical courts supplied the principles on which the
law of divorce a vinculo has been based. But the "fons et origo"
of modern English law is a statute. 22 The drafters of the first
Divorce Act perceived that the defence of recrimination was inappropriate to divorce a vinculo and did not incorporate it into
the act. In English law, though it has been affixed squarely to
the base of matrimonial offence, recrimination has never been a
defence to an action in divorce.
The doctrine of recrimination received various explanations in
the ecclesiastical courts. 28 The most persuasive rationale, however,
24
is that of the monumental Lord Stowell, who in Forsterv. Forster
emphasized its Roman Law origins:
Judex adulterii ante oculos habere debet et inquirere, an maritus
pudic6 vivens, mulieri quoque bonos mores colendi auctor fuerit.
Periniquum enim videtur esse ut pudicitiam vir ab uxore exigat,
quam ipse non exhibeat (Dig. 48, 5 13, 5).
[The matrimonial judge must observe and enquire whether a husband has lived chastely and has also been responsible for the preservation of his wife's morality. For it would seem to be most unjust that a man should demand of his wife a virtue that he himself
does not show.]

Lord Stowell pointed out that the doctrine was not applied in
Roman Law to the immediate subject of divorce, for the court had
no power to restrain a husband from repudiating his wife; but it
was important in deciding whether she was entitled to dower. 25
20

Introduced by (U.K.)

21

(U.K.) MATRIMONIAL CAUsrs ACT, 1965, § 1(1) (a) (iv).].
The grounds are:-adultery, desertion, cruelty, rape, sodomy or bestial-

ity: (U.K.)
22

28
24
25

MATRIMONIAL

MATRIMONIAL

CAusEs

CAUSES ACT,

ACT, 1937.

1965, § 1(1).

[See now

For a detailed

discussion of these grounds, see Davies, Some Aspects of Divorce Law
and Practice in England, 5 J. FAMILY L. 63 (1965).
Divorce & Matrimonial Causes, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85. For a lively
account of the history of this act, see Woodhouse, Marriage and Divorce Bill of 1857, 3 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 260 (1959). Of course, prior to
this act, a marriage could be dissolved by Parliament; the well-known
procedure is described in Woodhouse, ibid.
See Beamer, The Doctrine of Recrimination in Divorce Proceedings, 10
U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 213 (1942).
Forster v. Forster, 1 Hag. Con. 144, 161 E.R. 504.
Id. at 147, 161 E.R. at 506.
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When the only remedy available to the petitioner was divorce
a mensa et thoro, involving as it did not the slightest consolation
to the respondent, then the doctrine of recrimination was eminently
appropriate. The consequences of the severance of the marriage
bond could be disastrous to the respondent, particularly if a marriage settlement had been effected, 26 so that it would have been
quite unjust if a blameworthy petitioner should have obtained a
decree.
The remedy of divorce a vinculo, however, is less one-sided.
Except in a few jurisdictions, 27 it confers on both spouses an unrestricted right to re-marry; in many jurisdictions, the person
against whom the decree is made may yet claim substantial ancillary relief.28 The respondent rarely comes away empty-handed
even when the petitioner is granted the decree.
Yet the petitioner's own wrong-doing must put the court on
its enquiry. Elementary-platonic-justice demands that divorce
should not be available as of right to a blatant wrongdoer, that
divorce should not be peremptorily granted. This was foreseen in
1857 by the drafters of the first Divorce Act, which made the
granting or refusing of the decree generally discretionary where
the petitioner had himself been guilty of misconduct. 29 To this
day, misconduct of the petitioner prevents a divorce from being
peremptorily granted.3 0 Other common law jurisdictions have
followed the English pattern. 1
26 Cf. A CENTURY OF FAmVLy LAWS, 1857-1957, 353 (Graveson & Crane eds.
1957).
27 E.g., Pennsylvania, where a respondent guilty of adultery may not remarry during the lifetime of the petitioner. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, §
169 (1953).
Many jurisdictions, of course, require that some time elapse before
remarriage; the time varies from two years [MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 24 (1943) ], to three months. Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959,
§ 72 (Austl.). In both England and Australia, the initial decree is a
decree nisi, which does not become absolute until the expiration of the
statutory period, but leave to expedite the decree is available. See
Kingsley, Remarriage After Divorce, 26 S. CAL. L. REV. 280 (1953).
28 Alimony may be ordered to a guilty wife in some jurisdictions, e.g.,
Hawkins v. Hawkins, 187 Va. 595, 47 S.E.2d 436 (1948); O'Neill v.
O'Neill, 18 N.J. Misc. 82, 11 A.2d 128 (Ch. Ct. 1939); Trestrain v. Trestrain [1950] P. 198.
Custody too is not infrequently awarded to the unsuccessful respondent: Willoughby v. Willoughby [1951] P. 184; Hild v. Hild, 221
Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); Beck v. Beck, 175 Neb. 108, 120 N.W.2d
585 (1963).
29 Divorce & Matrimonial Causes, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 § 31.
30 See now (U.K.) MATmVONiAL CAusEs AcT, 1965, § 5(4).
31 Cf. Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 41 (Austl.)
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account in
The considerations that the court should take into
32
modern times were articulated by the House of Lords:
(a) The position and interest of any children of the marriage.
(b) The interest of the party with whom the petitioner has been
guilty of misconduct, with special regard to the prospect of
their future marriage.
(c) The question whether, if the marriage is not dissolved, there
is a prospect of reconciliation between husband and wife.
(d) The interest of the petitioner, and, in particular, the interest
that the petitioner should be able to remarry and live respectably.
(e) The interest of the community at large, to be judged by maintaining a true balance between respect for the binding sanctity
of marriage and the social considerations which make it conon the maintenance of a union
trary to public policy to insist 83
which has utterly broken down.
Until recently, it was difficult to find fault with the operation

of these principles. A balance was maintained between the interests of the parties and those of the public. But, of late, there has
perhaps been a tendency too readily to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner, even though he may be flagrantly the more
guilty party; the appellate courts have supported this judicial tendency even to the extent of overriding the refusal of a trial judge
to exercise his discretion against a very culpable petitioner.3 4
Nevertheless, in this conception, it is suggested, lies a ready
escape from the artificiality of recrimination. The strongest criticism of the discretionary principle, that it gives rise to decisions according to the "length of the judge's foot," is hardly available to
those who advocate the "breakdown" principle, which must accord
the widest possible latitude to a court.8 5 But provided the principles on which discretion is to be exercised can be determined with
sufficient clarity, judicial subjectivity can be avoided. Viable and
realistic divorce laws can retain the "doctrine" of the matrimonial
offence, recrimination no longer being a part of such laws. 6
Blunt v. Blunt [1943] A.C. 517.
38 Per Viscount Simon, L.C., id. at 525.
34 Cf. Copps v. Copps, The Times, June 18th, 1966.
85 See infra, p. 79.
86 The writer here for once does not subscribe to the opinion of authors
of that most scholarly book, JACOBS & GOEBEL, CASES ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (4th ed. 1961), who assert that "Adoption of the rule of comparative rectitude is but a first step in the abolition of the concept of
fault in divorce law, another cherished sociological objective." Id. at
450.

82
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III. A SUGGESTED "MODIFICATION" OF RECRIMINATION
The following scheme is presented tentatively as a starting
point for revision:
(a) Where both parties have committed matrimonial offences,
the court ought to direct itself to ascertain which of them,
if either, has effectively caused the failure of the mar37
riage.
(b)

If the court finds that the petitioner is overwhelmingly
to blame, then
(i) if there is a cross-petition, the respondent ought to be
granted the decree;
(ii) if there is no cross-petition, the respondent ought to
be invited to apply for a decree; if the respondent
does not want a decree, then no decree ought to be
pronounced.

(c)

If however, "the equities are equal," or substantially
equal, or perhaps where the guilt of the petitioner does
not exceed say thirty per cent of the total responsibility,
then decrees ought to be granted to both parties.
(d) A decree should, of course, be granted to the petitioner
who is less than, say, thirty per cent responsible.
(e) The findings of the court ought to be of high relevance in
the award of ancillary relief.

It will be argued that to assess the respective quantity of
wrongdoing is perhaps an impossible, and certainly an odious, enquiry. There is, however, a close precedent for such a proportional
finding in the law of torts. As in a few American jurisdictions, 38
English courts are enjoined to determine the respective responsibility of the parties where both have been negligent. 89 Thereby the
strict, recriminatory doctrine of contributory negligence has been
40
mitigated.
See infra, pp. 76-77, for a consideration of the mental element which,
it is suggested, is essential to this enquiry.
38 For an account of American jurisdictions, including Georgia, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Wisconsin and Nebraska which adopt a modified form of
comparative negligence, see PROSSER, LAw Or TORTS, 445 (3d ed. 1964).
39 (U.K.) LAw REFORM (CONTRBUTORY NEGaIGENCE) AcT, 1945, § 1(1).
40 Many American jurisdictions have, of course, tried to mitigate the
rigour of recrimination. Nevada's provisions [NE.v. REv. STAT. § 125.120
(1960) ] are dangerously lax, but those of Wisconsin [Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 247.10 (1957] come close to the scheme here suggested. See generally
Annot., 159 A.L.R. 734 (1947).
37
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The differences between assessment of liability for negligence
and assessment of wrongdoing are no doubt stark, but, once it is
accepted that the responsibility for the breakdown of a marriage is
not attributable solely to one spouse, then it surely becomes no
less than a duty of the courts to determine the respective responsibility of each spouse. The enquiry would be no more than an
attempt to ascertain the true fact situation.
That such an investigation may be odious is undeniable. But,
of course, courts perform much more distasteful functions. Judicial squeamishness is hardly a sound reason for judicial restraint.
The object of this as of other enquiries would be to ascertain the
truth, however unpleasant.
Litigation would be more lengthy and expensive, no doubt.
But again, tribunals administering other branches of law occasion
these inconveniences. I am convinced that relegation of divorce
suits to second-class status, and a fortiori their reduction to a painless experience, are far more conducive to contempt for both the
judicial process and the institution of marriage than are "archaic
divorce laws."
IV. WHY THE "MATRIMONIAL OFFENCE" OUGHT TO
BE RETAINED
There is very little in what follows which purports to be original, or indeed other than commonplace. I have, however, thought
it helpful to the dialogue to present in a brief and rather undeveloped form some of the more important arguments in favour of the
retention of the matrimonial offence. Needless to say, I do not
pretend that each has equal cogency.

A. THE

INCONVENIENCE OF CHANGE

It is a trite observation that today's jurisprudence does not
regard antiquity as a justification per se of existing laws. Yet the
existence of laws of long standing testifies, if not to their wisdom,
at least to their efficacy. Excesses of judicial activism and legislative frenzy tend to destroy the law's "stability," which the most
ardent of realists were yet concerned to emphasize. 41 This is particularly so where a wholly new legal machinery is established.
There have, of course, been times in which the law was too
static. To be radical in the eighteenth century involved no little
moral courage. But today, the ease with which legislation can be
41 Cf. CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW
PRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 1

(1923).

(1924), passim;

PoUND, INTER-
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passed and the readiness of the judiciary to discard inconvenient
precedents create an atmosphere in which it is probably more demanding to resist than to advocate change.
Sweeping legislation of any kind involves several disadvantages, whatever the value of its substantive provisions, which at
least place the onus firmly on those who advocate it. A substantial body of mature law and practice is rendered obsolete. Courts
and litigants are faced with situations for which no precedents are
available. Society thus renounces the advantages of historical maturity, and puts itself, as it were, in the position of a newly independent state. Of course, if it is proved that the law or machinery
is clearly obsolete, a modern society ought not to tolerate it. But is
this demonstrably so of divorce law?
A good deal of contempt is levelled at ecclesiastical law. Most
of it supposes that "overtones" of ecclesiasticism have no part in
our modern society-a far cry indeed from the days when it was
thought that "Christianity was part of the common law."42 Yet an
acquaintance with the reports of the consistory courts 48 would dispel any uninformed scorn. The judgments of the great ecclesiastical lawyers of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are
copious in wisdom, forthrightness, humour and humanity, and are
generally lacking in doctrinaire rigidity. It is not without significance that a modern matrimonial statute, enacted only six years
ago, provides that "a court exercising jurisdiction ... in proceedings for a decree of nullity of marriage, judicial separation, restitution of conjugal rights or jactitation of marriage shall proceed and
act and give relief as nearly as may be in conformity with the
principles and rules applied in the ecclesiastical courts ... before
...1857.2'"
To render obsolete at one sweep the whole of two centuries of
case-law of any branch of law would prima facie be unwise. Particularly is this so where its subject-matter-marital misconductof which there has
is "as old as matrimony itself,' ' 4 5 in respect
' 46
development.
new
alteration-no
"no
been

ma CommoN LAw (1965), who argues
convincingly that this assertion was far from being mere "rhetoric."
See particularly Vols. 161 to 164 of the English Reports, the most entertaining volumes in any common law library-with the possible exception of Howell's State Trials.
Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 25(2) (Austl.).
Per Lord Hershell in Russell v. Russell [1897] A.C. 395, 460-a passage
which may confound those who think "social realism" to be a product
of the twentieth century.
Ibid.

42 Cf. O'SuLLIVAN, THE SPIRIT OF
43

44
45

46
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COLLUSIVE PRACTICES REJECTED AS A VALID REASON FOR CHANGE

An argument of those who advocate "breakdown" is that fraud
and deception are so encouraged by the present scheme of things
that it is impossible to preserve it and still maintain the dignity of
the legal process.47 It is, of course, true that a great deal of collusion is practiced. Its extent and nature vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Once upon a time, it used to be thought that a fraud
on the courts was ipso facto an evil. But modern jurisprudence
sometimes tempts us to think that socially desirable ends justify
unprofessional means. With great respect, as long as the legal profession regards a decision such as Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel,48 in
which a blatantly collusive Mexican decree was recognized by the
New York Court of Appeals, as justified because it represents a
social "safety valve," 49 then one cannot expect practitioners to do
other than practice collusion and fraud. Again, it is respectfully
submitted that decisions such as Sherrer v. Sherrer ° and Coe v.
Coe, 51 are conceptually indefensible; nor is it likely that they
would be supported in any other branch of law, representing as
they do an anarchic mandate to evade unpalatable laws.
Every divorce practitioner naturally feels more sympathy for
his client's afflictions than for the "sanctity of the marriage bond."
In such circumstances the integrity of the profession is all the
more challenged. The way to remedy unprofessional conduct is
surely not to accommodate the law to it, but to seek to eliminate it.
Perhaps a greater emphasis on professional responsibility in the
education 5of
a lawyer would go a long way to reduce collusion
2
and fraud.
Again, it might perhaps not be unwise to mitigate the wide
application of the doctrine of collusion, so as to permit bona fide
agreements to be sanctioned, and vent anger on clearly deceptive
practices. 53 But to represent malpractice as a stimulus for reform
is surely to allow wrong to triumph over right!
47 See, e.g., Bradway, Collusion and the Public Interest in the Law of

Divorce, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 374 (1962).
48 16 N.Y. 2d 64, 262 N.Y.S.2d 86, 204 N.E.2d 709 (1965).

49 See Foster, Divorce Reform, 22 N.Y. COUNTY B. BULL. 165 (1965).
50 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
51 344 U.S. 378 (1947).
52 Cf. Introduction to SMEDLEY, PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBILITY PROBLEMS
IN FAMILY LAW (1963).
53 In England, collusion is now a discretionary bar. Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1965, § (4) (a) (U.K.). In Australia, only collusion "with intent
to cause a perversion of justice" constitutes a bar. Matrimonial Causes
Act, Act of 1959, § 40 (Austl.).
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C.

CoNcERN AT THE INCIDENCE OF DIVORCE

The incidence of divorce today is so high as to cause international concern. Should not society rather be seeking ways of limiting the availability of divorce? It surely is impossible to argue
that a divorce law based on consent, or "marriage breakdown," or
voluntary54 separation, would do other than increase the number of

divorces.

The Australian experience is typical. Since non-culpable separation was introduced as a ground throughout Australia, 55 the
number of divorces has steadily57 risen,56 and separation has become the third most used ground.

D. CoNCILIATION PRoCEDUREs
It is, unfortunately, naive to suppose that the establishment of
conciliation services will alone offset the increase. Again, what
has happened in Australia is significant. The Commonwealth Matrimonial Causes Act, 1959, the first uniform divorce statute in
Australia, incorporates a section empowering, indeed, commanding,
counsel and trial judges to attempt to reconcile parties. 58 This
section is a dead letter; it seems to be regarded as a political compromise, designed to appease those legislators who felt uneasy about
the great extension of grounds, and particularly the introduction
of voluntary separation. 9 The French experience is similar, 0 notwithstanding that the parties must appear before the court for this
purpose "sans 1'assistance d'advocats et avou~s"! 61 This is not to
54 Though this argument was astonishingly made in Scarman J., Family
Law and Law Reform, A Public Lecture p. 15 (1966). Scarman J. is
the Chairman of the United Kingdom Law Commission, though he expressly stated that in the above paper he was putting forward his own
personal views and not those of the commission. The commission, however, has since published a report favouring the introduction of separation as a ground. See supra note 5.
55 Supra note 11.

56 These statistics are the latest divorce statistics from the Commonwealth Bureau of Statistics (1966). In 1963, 3293 decrees were made
absolute; in 1964, 3024; in 1965, 3440.
57 1495 in 1963; 1687 in 1964; 1706 in 1965. See note 56 supra.
58 § 14.

59 The opinion of the writer based on remarks by an Australian judge, is
confirmed by Mr. Justice Selby, a judge of the Supreme Court of New
South Wales: Selby, The Development of Divorce Law in Australia,
29 MODERN L. REV. 437, 482 (1966).

60 See Commission on Marriage and Divorce, Minutes of Evidence, at 443
(Evidence of Maitre Allemes).
61 CODE CIvIL, art. 238.

76

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 1 (1967)

overlook occasional judicial enlightenment, such as that of Judge
and Judge Pfaff of the
Alexander 2 of the Toledo Family Court
03
Los Angeles County Conciliation Court.
The idea of establishing conciliation proceedings as an adjunct
of the court is highly commendable-indeed there is no reason that
they should not accompany a "fault" statute-but experience shows
that they cannot realistically be regarded as a quid pro quo for the
greater availability of divorce.
IN ORDER TO ADJUDICATE
E. THE NEED TO ASCERTAIN RESPONSIBILITY
64
UPON "ANcILLARY" RELIEF

If a judicial enquiry into the respective faults of the parties
could be eliminated altogether, the goal of those who want divorce
to be a more "civilized" procedure might perhaps be realized. But
the enquiry cannot be eliminated from the proceedings for it is
highly relevant to questions of (a) alimony (b) custody (c) matrimonial property and (d) costs. Professor Tenney's draft 65 is silent on these matters, but it can hardly be argued that the conduct
of the parties is irrelevant in questions of custody, though it may
properly not be regarded as conclusive. The other matters could in
theory be adjudicated without regard to the parties' conduct, but
serious injustices would result. No matter how "civilized" a law is
that permits a husband to divorce his wife in order to marry another, it would yet be an unjust law if it allowed him to do so
without any compensation to his wife. Even those who hold the
view that marriage is nothing more than a synallagmatic contract
would be hard pressed to justify a breach, or a repudiation if you
prefer, without damages.

F. THE REALITY OF "GUILT"
It is argued that it is artificial to attribute responsibility for the
failure of a marriage to one or other of the parties. If by this is
meant that in some marriages there are faults on both sides, this
can hardly be disputed. But if it is asserted as an immutable
Cf. Alexander, Let's Get The Embattled Spouses Out of the Trenches,
18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 98 (1953).
63 See PFAFF, THE CONCILIATION COURT OF Los ANGELES COUNTY (1960);
62

Burke, The Conciliation Court of Los Angeles County, 40 CHICAGO B.
RECORD 255 (1959).

I use this term despite the well-merited criticism of Stone, The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1963, 4 J. FAmILY L. 496 (1964), that the matters
referred to are all-important.
65 Tenney, Divorce Without Fault: The Next Step, 46 NEB. L. REV. 24, 41
(1967).
64
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principle that there is no such thing as matrimonial wrongdoing,
it is manifestly false.
A disillusioned marriage guidance worker once told me, "the
annoying thing about married people is that they will keep on
insisting about right and wrong-while I want to talk about 'adjustment'!" The fact is, surely, that most lay people are not given
to distinguishing legality and morality. Nor is this to be deplored.
The ordinary citizen has a keen appreciation of right conduct,
though he may not always articulate it with the perception of
Immanuel Kant. That the moral content of laws contributes to a
large degree to that sense of right conduct is a truism that the
most ardent positivist would not seriously dispute.
The delineation of that conduct which is considered a breach of
the marital obligation so as to furnish one who suffers from it
with an action in divorce establishes what amounts to right conduct in marriage.
Distinction must be made, of course, between that conduct
which will constitute a matrimonial offence and that conduct
which, though blameworthy, must be tolerated as "the rough and
tumble" of married life-the minima about which the law does not
care. The classic trilogy of matrimonial offences represents a practical compendium of that inexcusable conduct which most civilized
societies at most times have found serious enough generally to
destroy marital solidarity. They are, as it were, the actus rei of
matrimonial guilt. Replacement of proscribed conduct by nebulous
and amoral provisions would weaken the clarity of matrimonial
obligations.

G. Ti

haPossiBm
OF CoNRAtcTNG MARRIAGE FOR LIFE WHm
DIVORCE is AVAILABLE WITHouT PROOF OF AN OFFENCE

It used to be argued that opposition on religious grounds to
civil divorce was unwarranted: for the civil laws do not prevent
individuals from maintaining their own standards. The history of
separation in Australia suggests that this argument is invalid. The
Australian Divorce Act6" lists a large number of grounds for
di67 In
vorce, most of them based on the fault of the respondent.
66

Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 28 (Austl.).

67 In addition to adultery, cruelty and desertion, the following are

grounds: willful refusal to consummate the marriage; rape, sodomy
or bestiality; habitual drunkenness or drug addiction; failure to pay
maintenance; frequent convictions coupled with leaving the petitioner
without reasonable means of support; conviction of a serious offence
involving long term of imprisonment; failure to comply with decree
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addition, either party to a marriage may petition where the parties
have lived separate and apart for five years, regardless of which
party was responsible for the separation.68 But a number of provisions protect the respondent, one of which69 reads: "Where, on
the hearing of a petition for [divorce on the ground of separation],
the court is satisfied that . . . it would ... be harsh and oppressive
to the respondent, or contrary to the public interest, to grant a decree,. . . the court shall refuse to make the decree sought."
The effect of decisions on this section 70 is undoubtedly that
religious "scruples" will not generally be heeded by the civil court;
yet the civil court has full jurisdiction over the marriage.
In Australia, it is now impossible to contract a marriage for
71
life-notwithstanding the express provision of the Marriage Act,
that "marriage, according to the law in Australia, is the union of a
man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.172 For even if a husband and wife were to go to

68

of restitution of conjugal rights; insanity, for a period of at least five
years; separation; presumption of death.
Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 28(m) (Austl.).

69 Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959, § 37(1) (Austl.).
70 In Taylor v. Taylor, (1961) Federal L.R. 371, Nield, J., a judge of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, described this provision as "the
most extraordinary sub-section that has ever been passed by any legislature in the world." Id. at 372. He took the view that "the very fact
of the termination of the marriage without any fault whatsoever on the
part of the respondent . . .would be harsh and oppressive to the respondent." Ibid.
The strictures of Nield, J., have not, however, been echoed by some
other courts construing this section. For example, in Painter v. Painter,
(1963) 4 Federal L.R. 216, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South
Australia stated that "Unless [the respondent] will be seriously and
unjustly affected it cannot be said that the decree is harsh and oppressive." In that case, the respondent wife opposed the granting of a decree, inter alia, on religious grounds asserting her belief that divorce
was contrary to the law of God. The Court attached no importance
to this objection; adding that "it seems to us that, if the appellant is
genuinely convinced that the marriage tie is indissoluble by human
judgment, the decree will not alter her belief or her position. She can
disregard it." Ibid.
On the whole, it would seem that the South Australian decision has
been regarded as a correct approach to the legislation. See McDonald
v. McDonald, (1964) 6 Federal L.R. 53; Kearns v. Kearns, (1963) 4
Federal L.R. 394; Lamrock v. Lamrock, (1963) 4 Federal L.R. 81;
Contra, Taylor v. Taylor, (1961) 2 Federal L.R. 371; Macrae v. Macrae,
(1964) 6 Federal L.R. 224; Judd v. Judd, (1961) 3 Federal L.R. 207.
71 Marriage Act, 1961, § 46(1) (Austl.).
72 An authorized celebrant, not being a minister of religion, is obliged to
say these words to the parties at the marriage ceremony: Marriage
Act, 1961, s. 46(1) (Austl.).
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the length of covenanting by deed that they should remain married
for life, the deed would probably be ultra vires, as constituting an
attempt to ouster the jurisdiction of the courts or as contrary to
legislation of the realm.
Legislation "liberalizing" divorce is, in fact, highly prejudicial
to those who regard marriage as indissoluble. The argument to
the contrary, always rather contemptuously advanced, has been
shown by the Australian decisions to be specious.
H. THE

EFFECT OF THE

"BREAKDowN"

TEST ON THE INSTITUTION OF

MARRIAGE

Divorce by consent, or by unilateral repudiation, must weaken
the institution of marriage. The contrary argument, if advanced at
all, presumably rests on a paradox. How can one seriously talk
in terms of marriage as a "life-long" union, while literate citizens
know that they can at any time without difficulty dissolve it? An
English judge'73 tartly described this astonishing double-talk as a
"cynical jest.
I.

DIVORCEES AS A MARRIAGE RISK

Lord Devlin has emphasized the double effect of a divorce
decree-by which parties are not merely granted an absolution
7 4
from their present marriage but are also given license to re-marry.
75
Apart from a few minor restrictions, in most common law jurisdictions a divorcee has an absolute freedom to remarry. Yet the
divorcee is clearly a prima facie marriage risk. While society advocates increasingly severe restrictions on freedom to marry,76 yet in
this most clear case of possible unsuitability, not merely are restrictions absent, but in some instances, where a second marriage
77
is imminent, the decree is expedited to enable it to take place!
Where divorce is made freely available to all comers, not a
small proportion of applicants, either will have already established
another liaison or will be likely in the future to do so. No restric1 W.L.R. 1246, 1253.
74 DEvLiN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, chap. IV (1965). Lord Devlin
73 Per Dankwerts, L.J., in Hall v. Hall [1962]

points out that a petition for divorce is to be distinguished from a
petition for a judicial separation (divorce a mensa et thoro) in that it
embodies an application to re-marry. He advocates a separate process
in respect of each enquiry. Id. at 74.
75 See supra note 30.
76 See, e.g., JACOBS & GOEBEL, CASES ON DoMEsTic RELATIONS (4th ed.
1961).
77 Bastian v. Bastian [1966] So. Austl. St. 42 is a typical case.
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tions will bar their re-marriage, and they will be able to embark
on further obligations unhindered. Furthermore, of course, the
undertaking of new obligations will prevent, or at least discourage,
the meeting of old ones.
J. THE DANGER OF RESPECTABILITY OF DIvoRcE
Lamentations are heard on behalf of those who have to reveal the painful experiences of an unhappy marriage; pleas are
made that the process of divorce be made more "civilized"; public
men now hold office, though well-known to be very guilty divorcees; actors and actresses make capital out of spectacular divorces.
Divorce is becoming respectable. Dare I suggest it is near to
becoming fashionable? How much more accommodating must society's attitude become before people who remain married to one person are regarded as "bourgeois" and unadventurous?
Is there no longer merit in devotion and obligation to, in language which already sounds pass6, the "keeping of vows"? Marriage imports duties and responsibilities, voluntarily undertaken.
The happiness of many is directly or indirectly dependent on the
success of a marriage. Where divorce is granted for breach of a
marital obligation, ipso facto the obligations of marriage are honoured in their breach. Where divorce is available on unilateral
repudiation, admittedly the "freedom" of each individual is vindicated-but the obligations and responsibilities of marriage are devalued.
One of the obligations, or terms of the marriage contract if
you prefer, is that children of the marriage will have a stable,
balanced upbringing-which surely imports no more nor less than

the love, comfort and guidance of a mother and father; it may be
thought that this is a "right" at least as deserving of legal protection as, for example, an illegitimate child's right to sue a putative
father.7 8 If this "right" is protected, and it is submitted that it
ought to be, then by aiding parents unilaterally or consensually to
renounce these obligations, courts would in effect be creating actionable wrongs.
It might be argued that the courts are already doing this. But,
conceptually, they now grant a remedy for the breach of an obligation-if not identical, at least closely connected, with the obligation
78

Cf. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), where
the court accepted such a course of action existed, but strangely refused to permit the plaintiff to maintain it; it seems only a matter of
time before the action will be entertained. Cf. Williams v. State, 46
Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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to provide a stable upbringing.

If Professor Tenney's draft"9

were accepted, the courts themselves would sever the obligation.

V. AN INHUMANE ATTITUDE?
Most advocates of more liberal divorce laws at some stage ad-

vance the argument "if two people are incompatible, surely it is
inhumane not to permit them to divorce in a civilized and pain-

less way."
The charge of inhumanity is particularly hard to refute when
one has had practical experience of clients with marital difficulties.
The dispiritedness of an unhappy wife or husband is the most
poignant antidote to aloofness in any but the most heartless practitioner. At least as much as in any other field success in a matrimonial cause is deeply satisfying, and "failure" is much more irritating.
Now I do not think it is sufficient to reply to accusations of
inhumanity quite so blandly as did Lord Stowell: 80 "Humanity
is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice."
To this most human of problems, the law should, on the contrary, be ready to abandon artificiality, rigidity and olympian peremptoriness. How, then, is it possible to oppose what appears at
first sight to be a most humane revision? In the first place, I
think it should be clear that this paper does not oppose the legal
sanctioning of a de facto separation. The law long since realized
the fruitlessness of attempts to compel parties to cohabit.
What this paper fears and opposes is the likelihood that divorce
will become a commonplace process, the panacea for all marital
ills. Profoundly disturbing are proposals that divorce should become available as of right to guilty persons, and a fortiori persuasion that-there is no such thing as marital guilt. These conceptions, I suggest, tend to destroy, rather than advance, human dignity, and I fear that they form the axis on which the liberal divorce
laws will revolve. Perhaps there is some wisdom in G. B. Shaw's
aphorism: "We have no more right to consume happiness without
produciig If than to coisIume wealth without producing it.'
VI. CRITICISVI OF THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED BY
PROFESSOR TENNEY
Professor Tenney kindly let me have a copy of his draft'pro79

Tenney, supra note 65, at 41.

80 Evans v. Evans, 1 Hag. Con. 35, 161 E.R. 466.
81 Candida, I.

-

"
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posals before I wrote this article. They are rather striking. They
go further than any statute in common law countries to eliminate
"fault" altogether. In this they contrast with the typical modern
82
statute which adds "non-fault" grounds to a list of offences.
83
It has been called a "comproThe Australian act is an example.
mise"; 84 it is, rather, a betrayal of principles, providing for easier
divorce without eliminating what is said to be abhorrent in the
traditional approach.
Professor Tenney's proposals represent a skillful attempt to
provide efficacious divorce laws with all elements of wrongdoing
expurgated. Their fundamental philosophy is unacceptable to me,
for reasons which have already been elaborated. But, with respect,
I have doubts too as to their efficacy.
The most obvious criticism that the proposals invite is that
they grant carte blanche power to the court.8 5 The judge will have
neither precedents nor statutory criteria to guide him. And, of
course, the legal profession will be equally in the dark when clients
seek to know their prospects of success. Much speculative litigation
seems inevitable, and there is no less likelihood of blackmail and
collusion than under the present system: the "innocent" spouse may
well have to be induced to persuade the court that "a restitution
of a community of life corresponding to the nature of marriage
cannot reasonably be expected." 86
The use of social workers, psychiatrists, etc., as aids to the court
is, in principle, not without merit. It has, however, dangers. The
psychologists and sociologists may tend to dictate the result to the
court, particularly if the judge is hard pressed or inexperienced;
there will be a strong temptation for the judge with a wide discretion to delegate the responsibility of the decision to his acolytes.
Moreover, justice will not seem to be done if, as is suggested, 87 the
psychologists' reports are not available to the parties. There are,
but they seem to offend
of course, precedents for similar practice,
88
the core of common law jurisprudence.
Which, of course, includes all the present American statutes which
deviate in any way from "fault."
83 Matrimonial Causes Act, Act of 1959 (Austl.).
84 Barwick, Some Aspects of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 3 SYDNEY L.
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REv. 409, 420 (1961).

Tenney, supra note 65, at 41-42.
86 Id. § 3 at 41.
87 Id. § 2 at 41.
88 Quaere, do the provisions offend due process?
85
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The draft expressly does not refer to ancillary relief, but many
difficulties appear to confront the legislator who seeks to regulate
these crucial matters without reference to the conduct of the parties.89 Surely, some financial "consolation" should be given to a
wife who is to be repudiated, 90 and it seems undeniably unjust to
apply the same principles of assessment where the wife herself
wants the divorce in order to re-marry.
Legislators will certainly be aware that the passage by one
state of legislation of this kind may turn it into a divorce Mecca.
Jurisdictional obstacles will, one hopes, thwart most potential petitioners, but if their situation is desperate enough, some petitioners
may find it convenient to "establish" residence in the only jurisdiction which gives them a chance of "freedom." 91
There are no provisions in the draft relating to undefended
cases. The measures on their face seem to envisage personal presence of both parties-how else can the elaborate reconciliation procedures be put into effect? One fears that respondents will prefer
to permit a decree to go undefended than to submit to psychiatric
examination. Legislators will, it seems, be faced with a dilemma
when they come to consider the circumstances in which ex parte
decrees will be granted. If they are to be granted at all, then the
reconciliation procedures 92 will soon be obsolete; divorce will become an administrative procedure-the judge "rubber-stamping" a
decision already taken. (This is, of course, proposed in any event
in the draft where there is a separation for more than two years.) 9
If, however, ex parte divorces are not to be granted, then a deserted
wife will find it impossible to obtain a divorce.
Some difficulties of construction are inevitable, unless the draft
is amended. Paragraph 1 (a) refers to separation with intent to discontinue the marriage relationship. Does this refer to joint intent
or will the intent of one suffice? Suppose the separation has been
initially involuntary. What does "separate and apart" mean? Does
the word "apart" convey something other than "separateness"? Although the phraseology of paragraph 4 is eloquent, difficulties of
89 See supra,p. 76.

90 Cf. The effects of repudiation in Roman Law. BuCKLew, A TExTBOOK OF RoMAN LAw 117-18 (3d ed. Stein 1963).
91 Cases such as Lauterbach v. Lauterbach, 392 P. 2d 24 (1964), Wheat v.
Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d 793 (1958) suggest that residence may
supplement domicile as the jurisdictional basis of divorce. In any
event, as is well known, animus manendi is regarded tolerantly by
courts in determining domicile.
92 Tenney, supra note 65, § 2 at 41.
93 Tenney, Unpublished Draft of Divorce Law Proposal §§ 1 (a), 2, March
30, 1966.
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interpretation can easily be foreseen. "Substantial evidence" is not
a happy phrase-will proof beyond reasonable doubt or proof on
the balance of probabilities be required?
Surprisingly, the factors to be taken into account9 4 appear to
include two traditional "fault-oriented" grounds (three, if habitual
intemperance9 5 is regarded as a wrong). Is this compatible with
the philosophy of the proposals?
That physical illness 6 should be suggested as a criterion epitomizes what some might call the "hedonism" of the proposals-surely, physical illness is a misfortune during which the sufferer is in
special need of the comfort and compassion of his spouse. The
same may, indeed, be said of mental illness, 97 at least if it is curable.
Mental illness, incidentally, is a decidedly vague term.
It is not easy to see in what manner the length of the marriage
will be taken into account.9 8 On the one hand, if a marriage is of
short duration, the court may find itself less able to be satisfied
that the disruption is deep-seated.9 9 Yet if the marriage has lasted
for many years, it is less likely to be irretrievable! 100
The defences' 01 of condonation, recrimination and connivance
are clearly inappropriate to a "breakdown" statute, but surely to
abolish collusion is hasty. The scope of collusion might well perhaps be narrowed, 10 2 or it might be made a discretionary bar; 103
but deception of the court is surely as possible under the draft
statute, particularly with regard to ancillary relief, as under the
traditional laws.
Finally, the reincarnation of the doctrine of restitution of conjugal rights de rigueur'0 4 contrasts strangely with the philosophy
of the remaining proposals. It has overtones of a quid pro quo,
and the same end is foreseen as has befallen the reconciliation procedures provided for by Australian and French legislation. 0 5 JudgTenney, note 65 supra, § 3 at 42.
95 Id. § 3(d).
96 Id. § 3(g).
97 Id. § 3(f).
98 Id. § 3(h).
99 Id. § 3.
100 Id. § 3.
101 Id. § 6.
102 See supra, p. 74.
103 Ibid.
104 Tenney, note 65 supra, § 4 at 42.
94

105 Supra, pp. 75-76.
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es will find it odious to enforce, and litigants will be uncooperative.
VII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the widespread dissatisfaction with the machinery of divorce, I do not believe that the philosophy behind it
is unsound. Most of the dissatisfaction is due to the high incidence
of undefended cases, and the failure of the legal profession to act
according to strict ethical standards. The laxity of the profession
is, unfortunately, not discouraged by the connivance of the courts.
Although it is almost impossible, as long as cases in the tradition of Sherrer v. Sherrer,0 6 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,10 7 Estin v.
Estin0 8 and Williams v. North Carolina'0 9 continue to sanction
forum-shopping, to persuade a state legislature to enact stricter
legislation, it is suggested, with the utmost respect, that a tightening of the divorce process would be a step in the right direction.
The undefended, and particularly the ex parte, divorce is the
principal evil worthy of exercise. Is it not a perversion of values
to insist on the appearance at court of a person who violates some
trivial traffic law,' 0 while at the same time permitting marriages to
be dissolved ex parte? Is the extension of extradition machinery to
divorce suits wholly impracticable?
Certainly where the defendant resides in the same jurisdiction,
he or she ought to be compelled to appear in court, if only to receive
an oral coup de grdce. The unreality of present-day divorce practice will continue as long as courts are presented with only one
side of the picture of a marriage.
It is suggested that a reform of the law of divorce should be
concerned with ensuring that a careful enquiry into all the factors
contributing to the breakdown of the marriage be made. Much
more attention should be paid by courts to the mental element in
matrimonial offences-indeed it is worth considering whether mens
rea, perhaps in an attenuated form, ought to be proved in addition
to the actus reus specified as a ground for divorce-at least where
the grounds are nebulous ones such as "extreme cruelty.""'
106 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
107 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
108 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
109 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
110 The writer well remembers a morning spent at the Lincoln Municipal
Court for just such a violation, resulting in a fine of $1!
111 Cf. the very careful enquiry that French courts make, especially where
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With great respect, I fear that a measure such as Professor
Tenney's, superficially humane though it may be, is the first stage
towards the acceptance of non-judicial divorce as of right. If this
ever comes to pass, it will mean the end of marriage as an institution; it will be the end of the civilization built upon the basis of
that institution. "[E] asy divorce, carries in its train disintegration
of the family
as a unit of society, and so ultimately of society
11 2

itself!"

112

the ground is a discretionary one. See GOURDON, LA NOTION DE CAUSE
DE DIVORCE ETUDIEE DANS SES RAPPORTS AVEC LA FAUTE (1963).
A CENTURY OF FAmILy LAW, 1857-1957, 412 (Graveson & Crane eds.
1957).

